The Bolivian Coup Comes Down to One Precious Mineral

from Truthdig

NOV 13, 2019 OPINION


Bolivia’s President Evo Morales was overthrown in a military coup on November 10. He is now in Mexico. Before he left office, Morales had been involved in a long project to bring economic and social democracy to his long-exploited country. It is important to recall that Bolivia has suffered a series of coups, often conducted by the military and the oligarchy on behalf of transnational mining companies. Initially, these were tin firms, but tin is no longer the main target in Bolivia. The main target is its massive deposits of lithium, crucial for the electric car.

Over the past 13 years, Morales has tried to build a different relationship between his country and its resources. He has not wanted the resources to benefit the transnational mining firms, but rather to benefit his own population. Part of that promise was met as Bolivia’s poverty rate has declined, and as Bolivia’s population was able to improve its social indicators. Nationalization of resources combined with the use of its income to fund social development has played a role. The attitude of the Morales government toward the transnational firms produced a harsh response from them, many of them taking Bolivia to court.

“The idea that there might be a new social compact for the lithium was unacceptable to the main transnational mining companies.”

Over the course of the past few years, Bolivia has struggled to raise investment to develop the lithium reserves in a way that brings the wealth back into the country for its people. Morales’ Vice President Álvaro García Linera had said that lithium is the “fuel that will feed the world.” Bolivia was unable to make deals with Western transnational firms; it decided to partner with Chinese firms. This made the Morales government vulnerable. It had walked into the new Cold War between the West and China. The coup against Morales cannot be understood without a glance at this clash.

Clash With the Transnational Firms

When Evo Morales and the Movement for Socialism took power in 2006, the government immediately sought to undo decades of theft by transnational mining firms. Morales’ government seized several of the mining operations of the most powerful firms, such as Glencore, Jindal Steel & Power, Anglo-Argentine Pan American Energy, and South American Silver (now TriMetals Mining). It sent a message that business as usual was not going to continue.

Nonetheless, these large firms continued their operations—based on older contracts—in some areas of the country. For example, the Canadian transnational firm South American Silver had created a company in 2003—before Morales came to power—to mine the Malku Khota for silver and indium (a rare earth metal used in flat-screen televisions). South American Silver then began to extend its reach into its concessions. The land that it claimed was inhabited by indigenous Bolivians, who argued that the company was destroying its sacred spaces as well as promoting an atmosphere of violence.

On August 1, 2012, the Morales government—by Supreme Decree no. 1308—annulled the contract with South American Silver (TriMetals Mining), which then sought international arbitration and compensation. Canada’s government of Justin Trudeau—as part of a broader push on behalf of Canadian mining companies in South America—put an immense amount of pressure on Bolivia. In August 2019, TriMetals struck a deal with the Bolivian government for $25.8 million, about a tenth of what it had earlier demanded as compensation.

Jindal Steel, an Indian transnational corporation, had an old contract to mine iron ore from Bolivia’s El Mutún, a contract that was put on hold by the Morales government in 2007. In July 2012, Jindal Steel terminated the contract and sought international arbitration and compensation for its investment. In 2014, it won $22.5 million from Bolivia in a ruling from Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce. For another case against Bolivia, Jindal Steel demanded $100 million in compensation.

The Morales government seized three facilities from the Swiss-based transnational mining firm Glencore; these included a tin and zinc mine as well as two smelters. The mine’s expropriation took place after Glencore’s subsidiary clashed violently with miners.

Most aggressively, Pan American sued the Bolivian government for $1.5 billion for the expropriation of the Anglo-Argentinian company’s stake in natural gas producer Chaco by the state. Bolivia settled for $357 million in 2014.

The scale of these payouts is enormous. It was estimated in 2014 that the public and private payments made for nationalization of these key sectors amounted to at least $1.9 billion (Bolivia’s GDP was at that time $28 billion).

In 2014, even the Financial Times agreed that Morales’ strategy was not entirely inappropriate. “Proof of the success of Morales’s economic model is that since coming to power he has tripled the size of the economy while ramping up record foreign reserves.”

Lithium

Bolivia’s key reserves are in lithium, which is essential for the electric car. Bolivia claims to have 70 percent of the world’s lithium reserves, mostly in the Salar de Uyuni salt flats. The complexity of the mining and processing has meant that Bolivia has not been able to develop the lithium industry on its own. It requires capital, and it requires expertise.

The salt flat is about 12,000 feet (3,600 meters) above sea level, and it receives high rainfall. This makes it difficult to use sun-based evaporation. Such simpler solutions are available to Chile’s Atacama Desert and in Argentina’s Hombre Muerto. More technical solutions are needed for Bolivia, which means that more investment is needed.

The nationalization policy of the Morales government and the geographical complexity of Salar de Uyuni chased away several transnational mining firms. Eramet (France), FMC (United States) and Posco (South Korea) could not make deals with Bolivia, so they now operate in Argentina.

Morales made it clear that any development of the lithium had to be done with Bolivia’s Comibol—its national mining company—and Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB)—its national lithium company—as equal partners.

Last year, Germany’s ACI Systems agreed to a deal with Bolivia. After protests from residents in the Salar de Uyuni region, Morales canceled that deal on November 4, 2019.

Chinese firms—such as TBEA Group and China Machinery Engineering—made a deal with YLB. It was being said that China’s Tianqi Lithium Group, which operates in Argentina, was going to make a deal with YLB. Both Chinese investment and the Bolivian lithium company were experimenting with new ways to both mine the lithium and to share the profits of the lithium. The idea that there might be a new social compact for the lithium was unacceptable to the main transnational mining companies.

Tesla (United States) and Pure Energy Minerals (Canada) both showed great interest in having a direct stake in Bolivian lithium. But they could not make a deal that would take into consideration the parameters set by the Morales government. Morales himself was a direct impediment to the takeover of the lithium fields by the non-Chinese transnational firms. He had to go.

After the coup, Tesla’s stock rose astronomically.

This article was produced by Globetrotter, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

Vijay Prashad is the Director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and Chief Editor of LeftWord Books. He is a Writing Fellow and Chief Correspondent at Globetrotter, a project of the Independent Media Institute. He writes regularly for The Hindu, Frontline, Newsclick, and Bir
NOV 13, 2019OPINION
The Bolivian Coup Comes Down to One Precious Mineral
The Bolivian Coup Comes Down to One Precious Mineral

Bolivia’s President Evo Morales was overthrown in a military coup on November 10. He is now in Mexico. Before he left office, Morales had been involved in a long project to bring economic and social democracy to his long-exploited country. It is important to recall that Bolivia has suffered a series of coups, often conducted by the military and the oligarchy on behalf of transnational mining companies. Initially, these were tin firms, but tin is no longer the main target in Bolivia. The main target is its massive deposits of lithium, crucial for the electric car.

Over the past 13 years, Morales has tried to build a different relationship between his country and its resources. He has not wanted the resources to benefit the transnational mining firms, but rather to benefit his own population. Part of that promise was met as Bolivia’s poverty rate has declined, and as Bolivia’s population was able to improve its social indicators. Nationalization of resources combined with the use of its income to fund social development has played a role. The attitude of the Morales government toward the transnational firms produced a harsh response from them, many of them taking Bolivia to court.

“The idea that there might be a new social compact for the lithium was unacceptable to the main transnational mining companies.”

Over the course of the past few years, Bolivia has struggled to raise investment to develop the lithium reserves in a way that brings the wealth back into the country for its people. Morales’ Vice President Álvaro García Linera had said that lithium is the “fuel that will feed the world.” Bolivia was unable to make deals with Western transnational firms; it decided to partner with Chinese firms. This made the Morales government vulnerable. It had walked into the new Cold War between the West and China. The coup against Morales cannot be understood without a glance at this clash.

Clash With the Transnational Firms

When Evo Morales and the Movement for Socialism took power in 2006, the government immediately sought to undo decades of theft by transnational mining firms. Morales’ government seized several of the mining operations of the most powerful firms, such as Glencore, Jindal Steel & Power, Anglo-Argentine Pan American Energy, and South American Silver (now TriMetals Mining). It sent a message that business as usual was not going to continue.

Nonetheless, these large firms continued their operations—based on older contracts—in some areas of the country. For example, the Canadian transnational firm South American Silver had created a company in 2003—before Morales came to power—to mine the Malku Khota for silver and indium (a rare earth metal used in flat-screen televisions). South American Silver then began to extend its reach into its concessions. The land that it claimed was inhabited by indigenous Bolivians, who argued that the company was destroying its sacred spaces as well as promoting an atmosphere of violence.

On August 1, 2012, the Morales government—by Supreme Decree no. 1308—annulled the contract with South American Silver (TriMetals Mining), which then sought international arbitration and compensation. Canada’s government of Justin Trudeau—as part of a broader push on behalf of Canadian mining companies in South America—put an immense amount of pressure on Bolivia. In August 2019, TriMetals struck a deal with the Bolivian government for $25.8 million, about a tenth of what it had earlier demanded as compensation.

Jindal Steel, an Indian transnational corporation, had an old contract to mine iron ore from Bolivia’s El Mutún, a contract that was put on hold by the Morales government in 2007. In July 2012, Jindal Steel terminated the contract and sought international arbitration and compensation for its investment. In 2014, it won $22.5 million from Bolivia in a ruling from Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce. For another case against Bolivia, Jindal Steel demanded $100 million in compensation.

The Morales government seized three facilities from the Swiss-based transnational mining firm Glencore; these included a tin and zinc mine as well as two smelters. The mine’s expropriation took place after Glencore’s subsidiary clashed violently with miners.

Most aggressively, Pan American sued the Bolivian government for $1.5 billion for the expropriation of the Anglo-Argentinian company’s stake in natural gas producer Chaco by the state. Bolivia settled for $357 million in 2014.

The scale of these payouts is enormous. It was estimated in 2014 that the public and private payments made for nationalization of these key sectors amounted to at least $1.9 billion (Bolivia’s GDP was at that time $28 billion).

In 2014, even the Financial Times agreed that Morales’ strategy was not entirely inappropriate. “Proof of the success of Morales’s economic model is that since coming to power he has tripled the size of the economy while ramping up record foreign reserves.”

Lithium

Bolivia’s key reserves are in lithium, which is essential for the electric car. Bolivia claims to have 70 percent of the world’s lithium reserves, mostly in the Salar de Uyuni salt flats. The complexity of the mining and processing has meant that Bolivia has not been able to develop the lithium industry on its own. It requires capital, and it requires expertise.

The salt flat is about 12,000 feet (3,600 meters) above sea level, and it receives high rainfall. This makes it difficult to use sun-based evaporation. Such simpler solutions are available to Chile’s Atacama Desert and in Argentina’s Hombre Muerto. More technical solutions are needed for Bolivia, which means that more investment is needed.

The nationalization policy of the Morales government and the geographical complexity of Salar de Uyuni chased away several transnational mining firms. Eramet (France), FMC (United States) and Posco (South Korea) could not make deals with Bolivia, so they now operate in Argentina.

Morales made it clear that any development of the lithium had to be done with Bolivia’s Comibol—its national mining company—and Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB)—its national lithium company—as equal partners.

Last year, Germany’s ACI Systems agreed to a deal with Bolivia. After protests from residents in the Salar de Uyuni region, Morales canceled that deal on November 4, 2019.

Chinese firms—such as TBEA Group and China Machinery Engineering—made a deal with YLB. It was being said that China’s Tianqi Lithium Group, which operates in Argentina, was going to make a deal with YLB. Both Chinese investment and the Bolivian lithium company were experimenting with new ways to both mine the lithium and to share the profits of the lithium. The idea that there might be a new social compact for the lithium was unacceptable to the main transnational mining companies.

Tesla (United States) and Pure Energy Minerals (Canada) both showed great interest in having a direct stake in Bolivian lithium. But they could not make a deal that would take into consideration the parameters set by the Morales government. Morales himself was a direct impediment to the takeover of the lithium fields by the non-Chinese transnational firms. He had to go.

After the coup, Tesla’s stock rose astronomically.

This article was produced by Globetrotter, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

Vijay Prashad is the Director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and Chief Editor of LeftWord Books. He is a Writing Fellow and Chief Correspondent at Globetrotter, a project of the Independent Media Institute. He writes regularly for The Hindu, Frontline, Newsclick, and Bir

https://youtu.be/TvIXzeDLpMwhttps://youtu.be/TvIXzeDLpMw

https://youtu.be/rilblO0Mwm4

https://youtu.be/Cv9NSR-2DwM

The ballot box cannot dismantle settler colonialism

Opinion Nicholas Kattoura and Matt Kinsella-Walsh on September 20, 2019

September 17th marked the second Israeli general election of the year. It represented an attempt by Benjamin Netanyahu to regain a Knesset majority after failing to form a coalition government in April. His power grab backfired, with Benny Gantz of the Blue and White party emerging victorious. Many liberal analyses of this election, which pitted Netanyahu against his former Commander in Chief of the IDF, point to Israel’s continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as proof of the paradoxical nature of the “only democracy in the Middle East.” Some went farther, challenging the legitimacy of an election that does not include the votes of the five million Palestinian’s whose fates it would decide.

While the outrage is certainly warranted, and the question of Palestinians under Israeli control voting in Israeli elections an interesting one, the truth is that even if granted the right to vote, Palestinians would be left with no one to vote for. Virtually every candidate endorses the continued occupation of Palestine, and speaks quite proudly of their ability and willingness to kill Palestinians. However their personal depravities, as horrific as they are, come second to the violent structure of a settler colonial state. Settler colonial states, a category to which the United States and Israel both belong, are founded upon the subjugation and displacement of their Indiginous populations. In fact, on the year of Israel’s founding, its first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, celebrated what he called “the double miracle… more land, less Arabs.” His words encapsulate the essential truth at the core of settler colonial states, that their existence depends completely on the ongoing dispossession of Indigenous peoples from their land and rights. In Israel, this occurred in 1948, in a violent founding that saw 750,000 Palestians displaced into refugee camps. It happened again in 1967, as part of a Six Day War that generated another 200,000 Palestinian refugees. However, this displacement is not limited to periods of explicit war. In the West Bank, as part of a process that routinely violates international law, Israel demolishes Palestinian homes on a nearly daily basis to make room for Jewish settlements. Importantly, since 1948 Israel has refused Palestinians’ right to return to the homes and land illegally seized by the Israeli state. Many observers, us included, argue that this is because to do so would fundamentally conflict with the bedrock of the Israeli state, which posits in both structure and rhetoric a state for Jews, without Palestinians.

Although the Joint List emerged from this election as the third largest party in the Knesset, and, some have argued, with the power to play kingmaker, they cannot change the fundamental structure of Israel. While an influential Arab coalition is important, it is ultimately a form of harm reduction, potentially able to limit some of the most violent policies of the settler state by pushing for reform. However, reform from within the Israeli state will never undermine the historical bedrock upon which it stands. If Israel is intrinsically Zionist, as we all claim, then the framework through which the Joint List must operate becomes significantly more narrow. The Joint List, by virtue of belonging within the Israeli state, is constrained by the Zionist institutions it must work through. Our mistrust in electoralism, therefore, lies in the fact that harm reduction takes precedent over the dismantling of structures that produce harm in the first place.

Consequently, any argument for Palestinian voting rights within Israel strikes us as incomplete. To vote requires an implicit acceptance of the right of the state to rule, and it lends the state the legitimizing weight of a false popular voice. In such a manner, a Palestinian vote for Israel only reifies a state that depends on Palestinian subjugation for its continued operation. It means accepting its colonial precepts, and the endless drive for territory that comes at the expense of Palestinian lives. Settlements will never be stopped by the Israeli state because Israel itself is a settlement.The checkpoints and Israeli-only access roads that serve as the nuts and bolts of occupation and apartheid will not disappear with an election. The infrastructure of settler colonialism is built to last. At the end of the day settler-colonialism is not an event–it is not encapsulated in an election–but rather a structure: a continued project to disenfranchise, marginalize and displace Indigenous people in order to seize land.

The institutions of Palestinian oppression have existed since Israel’s founding, and have only expanded in the 70 years since, yet liberal authors constantly cite electoralism as a mechanism of change and opportunity for Palestinians. The BDS movement as a tactic for liberation did not emerge because of a specific prime minister’s political inclinations. Instead, BDS was articulated by Palestinians on the ground who were and still are subjected to excessive state-sanctioned violence in the form of checkpoints, illegal settlements and prolonged sieges. Benjamin Netanyahu oversaw Operation Protective Edge, which killed over 2,000 Palestinians during the summer of 2014. However Ehud Olmert, at the head of a center-left coalition, oversaw Operation Cast Lead, which killed over 1,000 Palestinians between December 2008 to January 2009. This is to say that whether left or right, the political leanings of the Israeli Prime Minister and their ruling coalition are irrelevant as long as they lead a Zionist state. To argue for voting as the preminent route for Palestinian liberation is a liberal deflection from the fact that violence against Palestinians is the crucial, non-negotiable factor for any Zionist political project.

Ultimately, while we understand and share the liberal anger that emerged in response to the Israeli election and continued disenfranchisement of Palestinians, we also understand that this reality does not change how we organize for the liberation of Palestine. Our movement did not start under Netanyahu nor does it end after Netanyahu vacates office. Whether Israel is run by Netanyahu, Gantz, or even a kibbutznik, our campaign for Palestinian liberation will not falter. Our goal has never been to elect the most liberal Israeli president but rather to dismantle the system of settler-colonialism that establishes the circumstances to murder, displace, and maim Indigenous Palestinians. In other words, electoral politics, while a potential means for harm reduction, will not save Palestine. That can only come from an organized mass movement both within Palestine and across the world.


Nicholas Kattoura is a Palestinian-American and graduated from Oberlin College in May 2019.

Tom Friedman’s belief in an ‘ancestral homeland’ is a toxic myth and not history

Yossi Gurvitz on March 19, 2019 17 Comments

from Mondiweiss

Reading a recent post, I made the critical error of clicking on the link to a Thomas Friedman column. I will not engage Friedman’s screed against Ilhan Omar – for the record, I’m on Team Ilhan – because I believe Friedman has too much blood on his keyboard to be seriously engaged. I will, however, take exception to an aside of his. Friedman writes:

I am not dual loyal. I always put America first, but I want to see Israel thrive – just like many Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, and Indian-Americans and others feel about their ancestral homelands.

Don’t know how to break it to you, Tom, but Israel isn’t your ancestral homeland. You were born in Minnesota in 1953. Your parents also lived in the US. Wherever your grandparents came from, it wasn’t Israel, since it didn’t exist at the time.

What you’re referring to, Tom, without even noticing it, is the myth that Jews today are all the descendants of Jews who once lived in Palestine, and as such have an eternal right to the land. This is the founding myth of Zionism, and it often masquerades as history. Let’s blow it up, shall we?

Let’s get back to 516 BC. The date isn’t random: this is the approximate time the Persian king Cyrus the Great issued his declaration which allowed Jews to return to Judea and rebuild Jerusalem. We need a snapshot of Judaism in 516 BC, and we’ll go on from there.

The term “Jew” is fuzzy at this time. Historians refer to people of the time as “Judaic”, that is some sort of proto-Jews. Seventy years earlier, the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar razed Jerusalem and exiled most of the skilled workers of Judea to Babylon. Most of the “common folk” (עם הארץ) remained, however, in Palestine.

So, there’s a large Judaic community in Babylon and the Persian Empire; a smaller but significant Judaic community in Egypt, near Yeb (they left impressive records), which will soon also come under Persian rule; and a Judaic community in Judea, of which we know absolutely zilch.

Not all Babylonian Jews were overjoyed by Cyrus’s declaration: Jerusalem had always been a hellhole, and in 516 it was literally an uninhabited dump. Most of the Jews decided to cleave to the dictates of the prophet Jeremiah (chapter 29):

“Build ye houses, and dwell in them; and plant gardens, and eat the fruit of them; take ye wives, and beget sons and daughters; and take wives for your sons, and give your daughters to husbands, that they may bear sons and daughters […] and seek the peace of the city whither I have caused you to be carried away captives, and pray unto the lord for it: for in the peace thereof shall ye have peace.”

The colonizing column which left Babylon for Jerusalem was relatively small, and its leaders whined about it endlessly. They reached Judea, and the first thing they did was clash with the rather surprised local Judaic community. The leader of the colonizers, Ezra the Scribe, was a Jehovaist, i.e. a strict follower of Jehovah; and most of the Judaic people had some doubts about this deity. Jeremiah again (this time chapter 44):

“Then all the men […] answered Jeremiah, saying: As the word thou hast spoken unto us in the name of the Lord, we will not harken unto thee. But we will certainly do whatever thing goeth forth out of to burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, as we have done, we, and our fathers, our kings, and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem: for then had we plenty of victuals, and were well, and saw no evil. But since we left off to burn incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, we have wanted all things, and have been consumed by the sword and by the famine.”

The Jehovaists were a relatively new cult (this is too long to go into here; maybe another post), and they had an uphill fight. Ezra demanded that the local Judaic community divorce and expel all the “foreign” women living in the community, as having a foreign woman was an affront to Jehovah; we don’t know what precisely happened then, as we have only Ezra’s version. But Ezra was an official of the king, and his word was sort-of law; so many of the local Judaic community left in a huff, presumably twisting a finger near their temple.

Shortly afterwards, for reasons unknown, the Jerusalem community promptly collapsed. Dunno, maybe expelling all those people was a not such a good idea.

Some unknown years later, likely around 20 or so, another attempt at building Jerusalem, this time by Nehemiah (another Jewish-Persian official), succeeded. At this time the Second Temple, by all accounts an unimpressive affair, was built. Nehemiah moans a lot about interference from people who might just be the people Ezra expelled, but we can’t know for certain. And then Jewish history slides into a black hole.

We have little knowledge about what happens to the Judean community between 496 and 332, when Alexander the Great appears on the scene. We know that the priests became the ruling caste, and we know of one case when a high priest was assassinated in the Temple, whereupon his friend, the Persian pasha, entered the Temple, took out the body and brought it to proper burial. According to priestly myth, the priests protested the pasha’s entrance into the temple; they said he was impure. The pasha’s furious reply was “Am I more impure than the body lying in the Temple?” But we don’t even know when this happened. Herodotus, the father of history, is in the region in the 480’s, but he doesn’t mention either Jews or Jerusalem; supposedly they weren’t important enough.

When Alexander comes on the scene circa 330, and with him people who actually know how to write history, we have a different snapshot of Jewish communities. There is a very large Jewish community in Persia, Syria, and Asia Minor; there is a huge, and hugely important, Jewish community in Egypt; and there is a relatively small community in Judea, with Jerusalem a minor city.

There are enough Jews around for Alexander to grant them several privileges, which will be kept for centuries and be ratified by the Caesars. Jews are exempt from work on the Sabbath, pay 1/7 less tax, are exempt from military duties, and there’s good reason to believe they were exempt from all taxes every seventh year (the shemitah). Not bad.

Judea is unfortunately placed between Syria and Egypt, and so became the prime marching land for the armies of Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Syria. The region changes hands several times. Then comes the Hasmonean rebellion.

The issue is messy in the extreme, so we’ll stick to the basic political facts. When the dust settles, there is a large Hasmonean kingdom, unloved by the Jewish people and hated by basically everyone else. This kingdom uses the inner collapse of the Seleucid Empire to bite off bits of Syria and what is today Jordan. It extends so far, at one point a major security issue is the Armenian Empire. Then, in 63 BC, Pompey comes along to stabilize the east, settles a Hasmonean civil war by taking Jerusalem and entering the Holy of Holies, and basically anoints Herod as king.

By this time, Judaism is a phenomenon to be reckoned with all through the Known World (oecumene, i.e. the world known to the Greeks and Romans). There are large communities all over Asia Minor, Jews are a major factor in Egypt (where they run the army), there are large communities of Jews in Greece (where they were unknown in Alexander’s time), and a large and vibrant community in Rome itself. The latter, outraged by Pompey’s defiling the Holy of Holies, would give a major financial boost to Julius Caesar in his civil war with Pompey; and once Caesar wins, he would bestow privileges upon the Jewish religious communities. Historians estimate that at this point, or close to it (4 BC, the alleged birth of Jesus, is commonly used as a benchmark), one in every ten residents of the Roman World is a Jew.

Again: 10% of the residents of the Roman Empire were Jewish circa 4 BC. That’s a very long way from the “who?” period of Herodotus’ visit to Palestine, and the communities are much, much stronger than they were even in Alexander’s time.

What happened? Jewish history is stubbornly silent on this point (or, for that matter, just about any other point), but all the evidence (particularly the archeological one) points to a massive campaign of conversion to Judaism, lasting centuries. Like Protestantism much later, Judaism had much to offer to a burgeoning middle class: seriousness, piety, stability, honesty, and a network of Jewish centers everywhere. Presumably that 1/7 reduction in taxes and the exemption from military service didn’t hurt, either.

In fact, Jews are all over the place – unless that place is Palestine. And they make the priestly caste obsolete even before the Second Temple is destroyed. Jerusalem is away and awful. Every community builds its own synagogue and – evidence is sketchy – likely has a rabbi by the 2nd century BC. A rabbi, not a priest. Technically, every Jew has to make it to the Temple at least on Passover and sacrifice; this is too unwieldy, so what happens is that every community sends a representative with money, who then buys cattle in the name of the entire community in Jerusalem, where it is then sacrificed. We’re talking huge amounts of money, moving all across the known world – and Hellenistic kings and Caesars alike make sure these convoys are not messed with.

To summarize:

Circa 4 BC, 10% of the Empire is Jewish. And there are plenty of Jews in the rival empire, the Parthian one.

The vast majority of those Jews were neither born, nor lived, in Palestine. Onwards.

Roman rule rubs the Al Qaeda faction of the Judea Jews – they preferred the name “zealots” – the wrong way. There are constant rebellions. Jesus’s reply to the question whether it is permitted to use coins with the face of the Caesar – “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s” – may be trollish, but the question was real. After all, the Caesars encouraged worship of themselves, which made the coins articles of avoda zara, idol worship. Zealots claimed control of Jerusalem by heathen rulers was offensive to God.

How many people supported them, and how many opposed them? Excellent question, to which we have no good answer. Obviously the elite opposed the zealots and the idea of war with Rome.

Then again, the elite of the Roman world was – everywhere – collaborationist. That’s how it got to be the elite. And we know there was real hatred between the common folk and the elites – priests and rabbis both.

Be that as it may, in 70 AD Roman armies set the Temple ablaze. If that was offensive to God, he left no comment. From that point onwards, Judaism did not have a center. There was, however, no exile.

I’ll repeat it: there was no exile.

For starters, the Romans did not have an infrastructure for a massive exile. Certainly, the 66-70 war caused massive bloodshed among Judean Jews. We have no idea as for the numbers, but they must have been great. And the Romans did sell tens of thousands into slavery – so many slaves, in fact, that slave prices dropped all over the empire.

But Judean Jewry continued to exist. Sixty years later, there would be enough angry Jews there for another rebellion, The Bar Kochva debacle. Legend has it that when the last rebel city, Betar, fell, the Romans were up to their knees in blood. The war was certainly a bad one for the Romans; they went to a lot of effort to wipe it from the records.

But, again, there was no exile. And 70 years later, the Jewish community in Judea was in its finest bloom: the collaborationist elite would write the Mishnah, there would be previously unknown wealth all over the place, and new synagogues everywhere.

Whereupon we reach the calamitous 3rd Century AD, and the empire begins to collapse. By the end of the 4th century, most Jews of the empire would disappear. There is only one recorded pogrom. We can safely assume they did what many Pagans did: they converted to Christianity when the emperors converted and staying non-Christian became too onerous. (We’ll leave the baffling episode of Julian the Apostate and the Third Temple for another time.)

Then the rabbis and the Talmud cloak it all up. They come up with the myth that “because of our sins, we have been exiled from our land and pushed away from our homeland.” It’s certainly a better line then “look, we tried to work with the Romans and fucked it all up,” but it has nothing to do with historical fact. It’s a myth; but it’s a myth repeated endlessly in prayer, and it is a myth which allowed people who were often despised and sometimes persecuted to believe in redemption: “Return to us, O Lord, our judges as before, and councilors as of old; remove from us sadness and all moaning, and reign upon us you alone, O God, in grace and mercy, and find us just in our trial. Blessed be thee, God, a king loving justice and judgement.”

And this is the myth that allows Tom Friedman to somehow believe Israel is his “ancestral homeland”, and the myth under whose spells 18-year-old Jewish boys kill 14-year-old Palestinians.

The myth that there is a Jewish Homeland, when there was never any. The desperate plea of a downtrodden people, transformed by Zionism into a toxic myth.

Myth isn’t history, and it doesn’t convey any rights. Before we fight the myth, we need to know it is a myth. You shall know the truth, and it will make you sick.

Ilhan Omar under attack for telling truth about Israel lobby

from
THE ELECTRONIC INTIFADA

Ilhan Omar under attack for telling truth about Israel lobby
Ali Abunimah Lobby Watch 11 February 2019


Minnesota Congresswoman Ilhan Omar is under attack for telling the truth about the power of the Israel lobby. (Lorie Shaull)
An update has been added to the end of this article.

Minnesota Congresswoman Ilhan Omar is under fierce attack from Chelsea Clinton and other Republican and Democratic establishment figures for voicing a fundamental truth: much of Congress is muzzled when it comes to Israel by the powerful lobby group AIPAC.

On Sunday, journalist Glenn Greenwald highlighted a news story about how Republican House leader Kevin McCarthy wants to punish Omar, and fellow Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib, for their criticisms of Israel.

In a perverse move, McCarthy tried to equate the two women’s support for Palestinian rights with notorious Republican Congressman Steve King’s white supremacism.

“It’s stunning how much time US political leaders spend defending a foreign nation even if it means attacking free speech rights of Americans,” Greenwald tweeted.

Omar then retweeted Greenwald, adding the comment, “It’s all about the Benjamins baby,” the title of a rap song by Puff Daddy.

“Benjamins” is a slang term for $100 bills, a reference to the portrait of Benjamin Franklin that is on the banknotes.


Then, Batya Ungar-Sargon, the opinion editor of the The Forward, chimed in, challenging Omar to explain who she “thinks is paying American politicians to be pro-Israel.”

Ungar-Sargon also accused Omar of tweeting an “anti-Semitic trope.”

Omar’s answer to Ungar-Sargon’s question was succinct: “AIPAC!”


That’s when the floodgates opened.

Chelsea Clinton “co-signed” Batya-Sargon’s attack on Omar. “We should expect all elected officials, regardless of party, and all public figures to not traffic in anti-Semitism,” the former first daughter asserted.


Other Israel lobby stalwarts, like President Barack Obama’s ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro, amplified the attacks on Omar:


As did the Israeli government itself, through foreign ministry spokesperson Emmanuel Nahshon:


Establishment publication Politico quickly came out with a story accusing Omar of touching “upon a long-running, and particularly ugly, thread of the anti-Semitic movement – that Jewish money fuels backing for Israel in the United States and elsewhere.”

Of course Omar never mentioned “Jewish money.” She referred to AIPAC – the American Israel Public Affairs Committee – a lobby group which exists specifically to defend Israel’s interests.

The story quoted her fellow Democrat, New York Congressman Max Rose, describing Omar’s comments as “deeply hurtful to Jews, including myself.”

The story quickly went national, with NBC running the headline, “Freshman Democratic Rep. Ilhan Omar accused of sending ‘anti-Semitic’ tweets.”

Target of smears
It is no surprise that Omar is the target of the kind of anti-Semitism smears that have been deployed against UK Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, given that she was the first member of Congress to openly support BDS – the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement for Palestinian rights.


Twitter users responded to Clinton with facts about the power and influence of AIPAC:


Others pointed out the sheer hypocrisy of Kevin McCarthy, a Republican leader who has trafficked in anti-Semitism but now pretends to care about Jews only when it comes to defending Israel:


Jeffrey Goldberg, the pundit and former Israeli prison guard, recounted in a 2005 article for The New Yorker a dinner he once had with Steve Rosen, the director of foreign policy issues at AIPAC.

“You see this napkin?” Rosen told Goldberg. “In twenty-four hours, we could have the signatures of 70 senators on this napkin.”

The power of pro-Israel money
Any observer of Washington politics knows that this is no exaggeration when it comes to the power of pro-Israel money.

It’s scarcely a secret that Donald Trump’s insistence on recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the US embassy there was in fulfillment of a promise to Sheldon Adelson, the billionaire pro-Israel mogul who is the biggest donor to the president and the Republican Party.

The influence of Adelson’s cash on US foreign policy has been enormous, even if media refuse to talk about it.

And just last week 77 of 100 senators voted for the AIPAC-backed Combating BDS Act, which targets the Palestine solidarity movement and violates First Amendment free speech rights.

Despite the fierceness of the attack on her, Omar does not appear to be backing down. She continues to retweet tweets, like this one, pointing out the massive influence of the Israel lobby:


She also tweeted to Chelsea Clinton that she’d be “happy to talk.”

Of course AIPAC is only one, albeit important, element of the Israel lobby.

It includes a number of groups, such as The Israel Project, Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Israel on Campus Coalition, actively interfering in American political and civic life in direct and covert collusion with the Israeli government.

Many of these activities were exposed in Al Jazeera’s explosive undercover documentary The Lobby–USA – which ironically the self-same lobby used its enormous influence to pressure Qatar, Al Jazeera’s patron, into censoring.

But the film leaked, and was released in full by The Electronic Intifada and two other publications last November.

All other things being equal, had this documentary uncovered supposed Russian, Chinese or Canadian interference in US politics, it would have been a media sensation and a national scandal.

Instead it has been virtually ignored.

Lobby influence waning?
Yet the fierce backlash against Ilhan Omar for stating the obvious can be seen as a sign that the Israel lobby, though still powerful, is losing some of its oomph.

While the Combating BDS Act passed by a huge margin in the Senate, prominent Democrats, including those running for president, voted against it.

And there are doubts that it will ever be brought to a vote in the House, for fear of splitting the Democratic caucus over Israel.

As long as the lobby held near-total sway, it was dangerous to criticize it.

The defiance of Democratic senators and the open criticism from Omar are signs that the fear the lobby instilled is waning as the base of the Democratic Party becomes more supportive of Palestinian rights.

At the end of The Lobby–USA, Eric Gallagher, a former AIPAC staffer then working at The Israel Project, is heard on hidden camera describing how the bipartisan consensus in support of Israel has seriously fractured in recent years.

Gallagher admits that AIPAC’s strength is ebbing.

“The foundation that AIPAC sat on is rotting,” he laments.

“There used to be actual widespread public support for Israel in the United States. So I don’t think that AIPAC is going to remain as influential as it is.”

He adds: “I don’t think that AIPAC is the tip of the spear anymore, which is worrisome, because who is?”

Update: Ilhan Omar “standing strong”
Throughout Monday, the pressure continued to mount on Ilhan Omar, including from top Democrat, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the rest of the party’s congressional leadership.

Echoing other attackers, the party leadership accused Omar of using “anti-Semitic tropes.”


The New York Times also amplified the smear campaign by implying that Omar had called out the role of “Jewish money” – a term the congresswoman never used.


In face of all the pressure, Omar tweeted that she is “listening and learning, but standing strong.”

She offered an “unequivocal” apology, but added: “At the same time, I reaffirm the problematic role of lobbyists in our politics, whether it be AIPAC, the NRA or the fossil fuel industry. It’s gone on too long, and we must be willing to address it.”


It remains to be seen whether her statement will appease the Israel lobby groups that are attacking her in bad faith, using well-worn tactics intended to silence critics of Israel.

Long experience suggests that any attempt at appeasing such lobby groups only invites more pressure.