Saturday, June 7, 2014

It Wasn’t Abortion That Formed the Religious Right. It Was Support for Segregation.

Amanda Marcotte
May 29, 2014
Slate

The religious right, who liked to call themselves the "moral majority" at the time, actually organized around fighting to protect Christian schools from being desegregated.


The modern religious right formed, practically overnight, as a rapid response to the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade. Or, at least, that's how the story goes. The reality, Randall Balmer, a Dartmouth professor writing for Politico Magazine, says, is actually a little less savory to 21st century Americans: The religious right, who liked to call themselves the "moral majority" at the time, actually organized around fighting to protect Christian schools from being desegregated. It wasn't Roe v. Wade that woke the sleeping dragon of the evangelical vote. It was Green v. Kennedy, a 1970 decision stripping tax-exempt status from "segregation academies"—private Christian schools that were set up in response to Brown v. Board of Education, where the practice of barring black students continued.

As Balmer shows, feelings about Roe v. Wade were mixed in the conservative Christian community in the early 1970s, with quite a few evangelical leaders agreeing with the court that abortion is a private matter. Desegregation, however, was a different issue altogether. Anger about forced desegregation of private schools galvanized conservative Christians. Bob Jones University stalled and resisted admitting black students, forcing the IRS to strip its tax exempt status in 1976, an event that spurred evangelical leaders to action. Jerry Falwell and Paul Weyrich, two conservative activists who had been seeking a way to marshal evangelicals into a Republican voting bloc, pounced. Balmer writes:

Weyrich saw that he had the beginnings of a conservative political movement, which is why, several years into President Jimmy Carter’s term, he and other leaders of the nascent religious right blamed the Democratic president for the IRS actions against segregated schools—even though the policy was mandated by Nixon, and Bob Jones University had lost its tax exemption a year and a day before Carter was inaugurated as president. Falwell, Weyrich and others were undeterred by the niceties of facts. In their determination to elect a conservative, they would do anything to deny a Democrat, even a fellow evangelical like Carter, another term in the White House.

The argument they used to defend school segregation will sound familiar to anyone following the lawsuits against mandatory contraception coverage in health insurance plans or the battles over whether businesses have a right to refuse gay customers: "religious freedom."

So what changed? How did abortion eclipse pro-segregation as the rallying cause of the evangelical right? Balmer argues that Weyrich, in particular, was a sharp enough political thinker to realize that pro-segregation sentiment was enough to get the ball rolling, "but they needed a different issue if they wanted to mobilize evangelical voters on a large scale." They took their new coalition of evangelicals and pointed them in the direction of fighting abortion. The strategy worked. In 1978, religious right leaders got their first victories by pushing the anti-abortion agenda, defeating Democrats in statewide elections in Minnesota and Iowa in campaigns that focused heavily on abortion.

Why were conservative Christians more interested in hearing about the supposed evils of abortion in the late ’70s than in the early ’70s? Balmer suggests that "the spike in legal abortions" after Roe was the shock to their system that made them realize that women really were going to use this new right they’d been granted. There was also a more concentrated effort to put out anti-abortion propaganda that framed the procedure as "murder" and suggested the next step was legal infanticide.

Balmer doesn't mention it, but there was one other shift in the public consciousness going on at the time. The "Stop ERA" campaign, headed up by Christian right leader Phyllis Schlafly to kill the Equal Rights Amendment banning sex discrimination, got moving in 1972. By the time male Christian conservative leaders like Weyrich and Falwell decided to make abortion a centerpiece issue, Schlafly had done the yeoman's work of convincing huge numbers of evangelical Christians that feminists were a threat to the very fabric of society. With hostility to women's equality rising, making the anti-abortion pitch was probably much, much easier.

Balmer notes at the top of his piece that it's common for anti-choicers to compare themselves to abolitionists. Once you know the pro-segregationist history of the religious right, however, it becomes clear that this comparison is not only obnoxious, but offensive.

Amanda Marcotte is a Brooklyn-based writer and DoubleX contributor. She also writes regularly for the Daily Beast, AlterNet, and USA Today. Follow her on Twitter.

Wednesday, June 4, 2014

Why are US lawmakers more enraged over Hamas-Abbas deal than AIPAC?

BLOGS » ALI ABUNIMAH'S BLOG

Submitted by Ali Abunimah on Tue, 06/03/2014 - 16:51
iss_00_1-3.jpg

Israel lobby AIPAC has not called for halt to US aid to Abbas-run Palestinian Authority

Prominent US lawmakers are demanding that the US immediately “halt” aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) after the formation yesterday of a “government of national consensus” endorsed by Hamas.

Republican senators Mark Kirk (Illinois) and Marco Rubio (Florida) issued a statement “calling on the Obama administration to halt and review US aid to the Palestinian Authority following President [Mahmoud] Abbas’ announcement of a new Hamas-backed transitional government.”

Kirk is a member of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee and Rubio, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has spoken about running for president in 2016.

But the senators’ position is at odds with that of leading Israel lobby group AIPAC, which has not called for an immediate halt to aid.

By going further than AIPAC, the two leading senators have revealed a split in Israel lobby reaction to the latest developments.

Yesterday, the Obama administration announced that it would work with the new PA government and continue its aid.

At odds with AIPAC

In its own statement, AIPAC claims that it was “greatly concerned and disappointed” by the “formation of a Palestinian Authority unity government backed by Hamas.”

AIPAC, however, notably does not call for aid to be “halted.” Rather it uses a more cautious formula: “US law is clear – no funds can be provided to a Palestinian government in which Hamas participates or has undue influence. We now urge Congress to conduct a thorough review of continued US assistance to the Palestinian Authority to ensure that the law is completely followed and implemented.”

Reached by telephone, Kirk staffer Danielle Varallo was apparently taken aback by Kirk’s deviation from the AIPAC line. Asked why Kirk called for a “halt” in aid when AIPAC didn’t, Varallo said that Kirk’s press release “doesn’t necessarily” call for a halt in aid.

When confronted with the clear language in the Kirk-Rubio statement, Varallo said further questions would have to be referred to Kirk’s legislative staff.

Confusion among Israel supporters?

Eric Cantor, the Republican majority leader in the US House of Representatives echoed Kirk and Rubio in calling for halting aid. “Until such time that it is determined that assistance to this so-called technocratic government is consistent with our own interests, principles, and laws it is incumbent on the administration to suspend US assistance,” he said in a statement.

New York Representative Nita Lowey, the highest ranked Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, reportedly “stopped short of calling for a funding review, but said the unity government endangered US support for the Palestinian Authority.”

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), another leading anti-Palestinian lobby group, also expressed caution, saying it does “not believe the US should immediately end all funding to the Palestinian Authority”

The ADL says it would “support the idea of a pause in funding US aid to see if the new government can qualify to avoid a full cut of funding under the 2006 Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act prohibiting US foreign aid to a Palestinian government which includes Hamas.”

Why the difference?

The reason that the US lawmakers are more extreme even than the powerful lobby group AIPAC is likely because they have somewhat different agendas: Kirk, Rubio and Cantor are pandering to an electorate and to campaign donors for whom acknowledging the very existence of Palestinians – like recognizing the reality of climate change – can be a major political liability.

It is also a way for Republicans to bash Obama as “soft on terrorism” or unfairly accuse him of being insufficiently pliant to Israel’s demands.

AIPAC’s role, however, is to push the Israeli government’s agenda. While Israel is publicly furious about the Abbas-Hamas deal, in reality, the Israeli government continues to work closely with PA security forces – collaboration that is funded and supported by US aid.

Netanyahu-Abbas partnership

Palestinian Authority de facto leader Mahmoud Abbas recently stated that his collaboration with the Israeli army is a “sacred” duty.

This partnership between occupier and occupied was recently praised by Martin Indyk, the career Israel lobbyist put in charge of the “peace process” by US President Barack Obama.

The “IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and the Shin Bet now highly appreciate” Abbas’ ongoing work with them, Indyk told an Israel lobby think tank in Washington last month.

“If there’s one thing [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] doesn’t want to do, it’s cause the Palestinian Authority to collapse,” observes Haaretz diplomatic correspondent Barak Ravid who notes that Israel’s angry reaction has gone little beyond words.

Indeed, as leading Israeli columnist Nahum Barnea recently observed, Netanyahu is the Palestinian Authority’s “savior,” repeatedly stepping in to ensure its survival so it can continue to perform its functions.

Despite its bluster, Israel remains closely allied with the Palestinian Authority, on which it relies to maintain control of millions of Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank.

And this means that as long as the Abbas-run PA continues to serve as Israel’s native enforcer, AIPAC will ensure that the funds from Washington continue to flow into its coffers.

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Ah Palestine: a non-existing land without people for a non-existing people

The Israeli Supreme court has recently ruled that there is no such thing as an "Israeli" recognized by the legal system of the State of Israel. You can be classified as a Jew, an Arab, a Druze, a foreign visitor, but nobody is "Israeli." Just a short while ago the Knesset created a new status, "Christian." So now a Palestinian Christian, who had previously been classified as merely an "Arab," can now not be an Arab but a Christian and be accorded some rights that are currently denied to regular Palestinians, who are classified as Arabs. Israel has never wanted to give any credence to the fact that there ever was a place called Palestine that had people in it.

(see http://mondoweiss.net/2014/06/discrimination-decisions-nationality.html
article by Ofra Yeshua Lyth, from June 3, 2014 Mondoweiss.org)

But now it has definitely been ruled that there is no common ground, no catch-all status of "Israeli." Therefore, Israeli citizenship is an empty category. It does not resemble any idea of "citizenship" that we as citizens of the USA, or Canadian, or Mexican citizens can recognize. In Israel citizenship is meaningless and "Nationality" is everything (if you can get past the idea that a religion is also a nationality...I wonder if someone presenting a Unitarian Church passport would get through customs.)


This all makes sense if you are running a caste system in which the Nationality/Religion "Jewish" gets full rights and others get less, or no rights at all. This is what Israel is. It is not a modern Western style democracy that just happens to have a "discrimination" problem, or to have by accident acquired extra territory with some undesirable people on it.

In the news media when someone quotes an "Israeli" source, or a government representative they always mean "Jewish," but they never say "a Jewish government source has said..." But according to the Supreme Court of the State of Israel (I don't want to say "Jewish Supreme Court") Israelis don't exist. The leaders of the State of Israel are always thumping their chests proclaiming "we are the Jews!" "We are the only Jewish state in the world and we represent all the Jews of the world."

But if some critic were to say, " I don't like what the Jews are doing in the West Bank." The reaction would be, "Anti-Semite!!! Jew hater." Well...maybe this isn't an important point. After all, whenever someone says, "I don't like what the Israelis are doing in the West Bank," the response is "Anti-Semite! Jew hater!"

Many of us who support human rights for Palestinians have encountered retorts from defenders of Israeli Apartheid who say, "there are no Palestinians, they don't exist." This is a popular line. A lot of people who think they are clever, worldly and liberal like to say this (like ex-Mayor Michael Bloomberg). Think about it though. There are over 5 million Palestinians living between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River (about the same as the number of Jews living there). they are Arabs (native speakers of Arabic) whose ancestors have lived in a place known as Palestine at least since the 5th century BC (as attested to by Herodotus, who started the genre of History writing) and certainly longer than that.

For the Zionists to deny their nationality is to deny their right to exist..or to exist within the lands that the Jews of Israel claim as their exclusive property. This is an eliminationist, ethnic cleansing, rabid xenophobic point of view. There is no left, right or center here, just push them out. Get rid of them.

So now Israelis don't exist and Palestinians don't exist. Leaders of the state of Israel are always wailing about an "existential threat" to Israel presented by...everyone and everything. BDS, halting settlement construction, protest marches, African refugees (officially called "infiltrators"), you name it.

But how can there be an existential threat to non-existing Israelis from Palestinians who also don't exist? Jean Paul Sartre seemed to corner the nothingness market with his tome "Being and Nothingness." But now he's been outdone.





Discrimination is legal, there are no Israelis: Reading the Supreme Court’s decisions on Israeli nationality

NOTE: A Very Important article. This is the smoking gun. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled that by law Israel is a Jewish Religious/Ethnocracy. Mere citizenship does not give non-Jews ANY rights. Only Jews have inalienable human rights. The rest get only whatever the ruling Jewish ethnocracy chooses to grant. And this is within what is recognized as The State of Israel. In the West Bank all non-Jews are under military law. Here is your "onlydemocracyinthemideast."
---RC




Ofra Yeshua-Lyth on June 3, 2014 6
Israeli ID cards in an immigration absorption center in Jerusalem, January 22, 2008 (Photo: Anna Kaplan/Flash90)

With two lengthy reasoned, precedential verdicts issued in recent months, the Israeli Judicial branch has joined the Executive and Legislative branches, offering its own full backing and blessing to a widely known practice, confirming that in Israel there is no legal basis for civil equality. The state may and does openly and officially discriminate between its citizens according to their religious and ethnic origins. Furthermore, it even bars the right of individuals to determinate the civic status by which they wish to be registered. For many years we have become accustomed to the impossibility facing people who wish to be defined “Jewish” without proper credentials. Now it appears that breaking out of one’s branding as a member of the privilege-rich Jewish nationality is also impossible in the Jewish-but-not-really-democratic Israel of the 21st century.

A unanimous rejection met the appeal of 21 members of the “Ani-Israeli” (I am Israeli) association headed by the linguist Professor (emeritus) Uzzi Ornan. Their request, as represented by the lawyers Yoella Har-Sheffi and Yosef Ben Moshe, was to be registered as Israeli nationals, instead of the common practice of registering the nationality according to their ethnic origins or the religion of their parents. Petitioners included Jews, Arabs, a Burmese, a Druze and a Russian. The appeal had been shuffled in the courts’ hierarchy for over ten years before it finally and ultimately was rejected by a venerable panel of three Supreme Court Justices headed by no other then the President, the Honorable Asher Grunis. The verdict decried clearly and unambiguously that there is not and cannot be one nationality for all Israeli citizens. [1] This stirred a certain interest in Israel, and was received with some real amazement in overseas circles that follow news from this country, including those who could – at last – receive an official confirmation to their years-long suspicions about the real nature of the Israeli regime. [2]

The ink had not yet dried on this decree when another panel of Supreme Court Judges produced – much faster, and under the veil of silence offered by the cooperative and uninterested Israeli media – another essential and crucial verdict directly related to the same issue. Professor Uzzi Ornan – as mentioned earlier, the founder of the Ani-Israeli Association – demanded that the Ministry of the Interior be instructed to register him as an Israeli citizen “by virtue of residency” instead of a citizen “by virtue of the right of return according to article 2(b) of the 1952 Nationality Act.” According to this act “Citizenship by virtue of the Right of Return” is awarded to “whoever made Aliya to the land or was born in it before the establishment of the state – as of the date of the establishment of the state.” As in the Ani-Israeli case, Professor Ornan was represented by advocates Yoella Har-Sheffi and Yosef Ben Moshe. [3]

Ornan, who was born in the land of historic Palestine-Israel in 1923 and became one of the founders of Hebrew linguistics, celebrated his 90th birthday on the year this appeal was launched. Since the establishment of the state of Israel Ornan has consistently refused, in each and every encounter with the Israeli bureaucracy, to accept a definition of “Jew” or “citizen by virtue of the Law of Return.” Still he discovered that contrary to all his written declarations he was branded in all the registries of the Ministry of the Interior as a citizen by this definition, a member of the privileged-by-ancestry group of Jewish Israelis.

As a native of the land Professor Ornan could think of no reason why he should not be registered – same as hundreds of thousands of native non-Jews – as an Israeli citizen by virtue of residency. The three Supreme Court Judges apparently thought differently. Their position was eloquently summarized by the Hon. Elyakim Rubinstein, who also took the trouble to express his high esteem as well as birthday greetings to the applicant. He even mentioned in his verdict that many years ago Ornan was his Hebrew teacher in the university, and that prior to this Ornan was a member of the ETZEL (Irgun) underground against the British mandate, and served a five year prison term in Eritrea in the 1940s.

“Clearly the intention of the Law of Return was a matter of principal, and its reason is the linkage between Jews and the Land of Israel,” Rubinstein asserts, rejecting point blank Ornan’s interpretation that the law should only apply to people who were born elsewhere and emigrated to this land.

Rubinstein continues: “The State of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State is a highly precious pledge deposited in our hands, it is the realization of the Zionist idea, it is the only Jewish state on earth, while it must aspire to offer appropriate equality for minorities; and this court cannot be expected to erode its essence and its character.” [4]

What, then, is the “essence and the character” of the “Jewish and democratic state” so dear to the heart of the Hon. Rubinstein? A related question would be, how to resolve the contradiction within our most superior judicial arena, which recommends the state to “aspire to offer appropriate equality for minorities” while with the same single breath authorizes the same state to use legal tools which facilitate the blatant discrimination between the “Law of Return” citizens and the citizens “by virtue of residency”? To brand citizens according to “national” criteria which are nothing but ethnic and religious distinctions?

Reading the position the state presented in response to the “Ani Israeli” appeal reveals that from the very start, the jurists in the Ministry of Justice considered this appeal as aspiring to “undermine the infrastructure of the Jewish State” and therefore they considered the appeal “doomed to be crushed”. More than ten years later, the Supreme Court adopted this position in a fully detailed and well-reasoned document, while taking into account, as asserted by the honorable Judge Uzzi Fogelman, that:

“we are dealing here with a sensitive and highly controversial issue on both a historical and moral level that has been with the Jewish people for many years and with the Zionist movement from its very beginnings. The concept that Judaism is not merely a religious but also a national affiliation is a cornerstone of Zionism. Against it presents itself the concept according to which Judaism is merely a religion, and therefore the national affiliation of Jews is according to the state of which they are citizens.” [5]

The Hon. Fogelman and his co-panelist the hon. Hanan Meltzer invoked –in the long position papers they both contributed – many judicial as well as non-judicial authorities. Their texts are embedded with references from leading social and political thinkers with emphasis on Israeli scholars (e.g. Alexander Yacobson, Menny Moutner, Ruth Gabizon, Amnon Rubinstein, Barak Medinah and Chaim Ganz) and others whose line of writing is compatible with the position of the court (e.g. Martin Gilbert). With several variations, all these writers obviously made the case for the justification of the Jewish-Israeli linkage in its present incarnation.

Even poetry was called up to corroborate the court’s assertion that the situation will never exist where “one gets up in the morning all of a sudden feeling as a people and starts walking.” [6] Judge Hanan Meltzer included the full text of this poem by Amir Gilboa in his conclusion that fully supported the verdict of Judge Fogelman. It was the Hon. Meltzer who supplied the headlines that summarized this highly important court’s decision:

“The petitioners did not succeed in presenting the case that […] (factually and judiciously) an Israeli Nationality has developed, as they pretend, which is shared by members of different religions, or people who have no religion, or those who belong or did belong in the past to different ethnic groups.” [7]

Judge Meltzer added: “The constitutional Jewish-ness of the state negates any judicial option to recognize an ‘Israeli nationality’ which supposedly is separated from the ‘Jewish nationality’, as had been so well illuminated by Court President Agranat in his verdict concerning the Tamarin case [8]… furthermore – denying the other nationalities in Israel and including them all in the ‘Israeli nationality’ is contrary to the democratic character of the state.” [9]

A particularly interesting aspect of the Supreme Court’s ruling is the fact that while rejecting the appeal the panel chose not to accept the rational used by the lower court that ruled against the applicants in the first place. In the district court of Jerusalem, the Hon. Judge Noam Solberg (who in the meantime was promoted to the Supreme Court) decreed that the demand to recognize the Israeli Nationality should not be judged by the court because the issue is “not judicial” and should be left to the legislative branch to deal with. The three Supreme Court judges unanimously rejected this argument, making clear that they are indeed authorized to discuss the issue of nationality registration, which in their view is in the range of “normative judgment.” In so decreeing, they – surprisingly – exercised judgmental activism. Mostly, judgmental activism is complained against by right-wing critics of the Supreme Court. Not too surprisingly, the only criticism this time on this position was voiced by a scholar identified with the progressive wing of the juristic elite, Professor Aeyel Gross. [10]

It is perhaps no coincidence that these two fascinating precedential verdicts in issues of civic and “national” rights in Israel were decried by the judicial branch in an era that sees the legislative branch so busy with the production of a large variety of abusive laws. These laws are all based on the principal of preserving the Jewish essence and character of the state, and the enhancing of privileges to its citizens who are of Jewish extract. [11]

For the executive branch, acting through the different government ministries and the security forces it has at its disposal, this regime of privileges is a discipline as old as the state itself. The practice of discriminating against citizens of non-Jewish extract, with emphasis on the non-Jewish Arab population, has been exercised in the early years of the state mainly under the all-encompassing umbrella of the Military Rule. Ever since the early 1950s, this practice was given the backings of a meticulous legislative enterprise that advanced with little or no protest from generations of juristic academic elites. No less than 55 such laws have been passed and canonized. [12] Practically in all of them, the distinction between “citizens by virtue of the Law of Return” and “citizens by virtue of residency” is the critical sovereign tool for the actual implementation of the discrimination. In this respect, the important recent precedential verdicts are merely the last nails for the coffin on the idea of Israeli democracy: they make sure there will be no way to label Israel a regular liberal democracy where all citizens are equal before the law.

When the Hon. Judge Rubinstein calls on the state to “aspire for appropriate equality” and with his colleagues repeating dozens of times the mantra “Jewish and Democratic” that they apparently see as self evident, the innocent reader might have assumed that the venerable panel aspires to bring a full or at least partial annulment of this list of disgraceful laws, practices and regulations. Not that the legislative house, the present Knesset, would have taken notice of any such polite recommendation to stop its accelerated galloping towards ever more initiatives that are meant to further harass non-Jewish Arab citizens of Israel.

“Citizenship by virtue of the Right of Return” is the most basic, enormously useful concept for the actual practicing of discrimination between Israeli citizens. It is of course a euphemism for citizens that the religious establishment is prepared to confirm their claim for Jewish identity or for the Jewish identity of a family relative second time removed.

The instrument for the determination of the “brand of citizenship” is the Population Registry and the traces it leaves in the identification cards we carry: citizens of “Jewish nationality” are treated differently from citizens of other “nationalities” – especially from citizens who have “Arab nationality” – upon dealing with the civil servants whose job is to carry out the policies designed by the state. This happens at the border control checkpoints, at the military government’s checkpoints in the occupied territories, in the Ministry of the Interior – the authority issuing residency and citizenship IDs – and at Israel’s Land Administration.

Many Israelis are comfortable with the notion that the “nationality” section in our identification cards was cancelled in the year 2002; they would point at the line of asterisks replacing the word “Jewish” or “Arab” or “other” in the IDs issued after this date. But this is nothing but an extremely transparent smokescreen. For the appointed officials in charge of the different discrimination junctions, a split second is enough to correctly identify the “national identity” of the citizen standing in front of them with a blue Israeli ID. Jews – and only Jews – have the date of birth registered according to the Hebrew calendar. If this is not enough, IDs of non-Jews are the only ones with a seemingly innocent section for the first name of the grandfather.

There is no lack of data documenting the Israeli discrimination system. It is available in thousands of research papers and reports. [13] Issues are of a rich variety, covering the various ways an individual interfaces with the government. Education, welfare, commerce and industry, certainly zoning and building permits, not to mention the infamous “citizenship regulations” are naturally included. A non-Jewish citizen going abroad for a few years will discover that his or her citizenship had been revoked. A Jew may always present oneself after being absent for dozens of years and enjoy the perks of “the Law of Return”. Spouses and even children of non-Jewish citizens normally are not recognized for citizenship and mostly not even allowed residency.

The distinction between the Jewish Nationality and all other nationalities is the fundamental generator for the number one Israeli-Jewish existential anxiety, otherwise known by its official title “The Demographic Threat.” The Palestinians were not left alone in this scary category. Labor immigrants, refugees and family members of so called Jewish immigrants are also treated according to the basic criterion that sees every non-Jewish individual as a menace over the future of the Jewish State.

The present treatment of the Bedouin citizens in the Negev Desert, in the south of Israel, provides a perfect test case – one that could hardly be dreamed up. Bedouin settlements are supposed to be uprooted. Their lands will be used to erect settlements based on ethnically pure Jewish settlers. Forests of the Jewish National Fund already cover historical pastoral grounds and more are about to be planted. Jewish “individual farming” settlements are sponsored and subsidized. No Bedouin may hope to be allowed such a one-family-unit farm, specializing in offering goat and sheep cheeses, as well as “zimmers” hospitality suites (“Bedouin-style hospitality” thus declared an exclusive Jewish-only tradition!).

***

At an even deeper level of the “national distinction” so fundamental to the Israeli substance is the fact that there is actually nothing national about it. Israeli academic and intellectual liberals of all political currents have made a habit of effortlessly clearing this inconvenient huddle, persistently refusing to face the obvious: a “Jew” in Israel is only one who is so defined by the state’s officially recognized institutions of the Jewish Orthodoxy. The “Jewish nation” is nothing but a religious closed sect running on purely religious principles.

In other words, the central element in the “determination” of the Israeli state and of its group of chosen citizens is their religious affiliation. The entry gates of the Jewish closed sector are hermetically locked for those who were not born Jewish or had not “properly” converted into Judaism. We had always know that for conversion to be accepted by the state one must take on the Sisyphean, years-long task of being immersed in the most severe version of orthodox Judaism. It now appears that exiting the same sector is no less problematic. The late author Yoram Kaniuk created quite a stir when he managed to extract a Supreme Court verdict that allowed him to cancel his registration as a Jew according to his religion in the Population Registry. The “religion” clause exists in the registry of the Ministry of the Interior as information available to the state but not visible on ID cards and inaccessible to a citizen not making a special effort to find out what is written there. As many of the immigrants into Israel by virtue of the “law of Return” are not recognized as Jews by the rabbinical establishment, the registry of a person as “non Jewish” while at the same time “eligible according to the Law of Return” is no real problem for the highly convoluted Israeli bureaucracy. Kaniuk conducted an adequate legal battle and his aim was fulfilled. But he remained a citizen by virtue of the Law of Return.

Against this background the flat, determined rejection of Uzzi Ornan’s appeal is even more interesting. The judges in Jerusalem are not really interested in the faith and beliefs of the applicant, but in his linkage to the Jewish religious group, whose perimeters are exclusively the prerogative of the religious institutions. Ornan’s attempt to disengage himself from this group was decisively crushed. In the Ani Israeli case, Judge Fogelman was left in the minority as he expressed the opinion, that the 21 applicants [14] have the option of requesting that the “nationality clause” in their entry at the Population Registration be erased altogether. Both President Grunis and Judge Meltzer would not endorse this idea. It should be noted that the applicants had no interest in such a “solution” as their intention was to define a nationality that should be accessible to every citizen of the State of Israel.

The failure of Ornan, as well as the failure of the Ani-Israeli applicants in fact indicates a resounding denial of their right for self determination in the state they live in. With the Ani-Israeli petition, the judges claimed that there is no such thing as “Israei Nationality” thus denying the 21 petitioners their right to determine themselves as Israelis. Their refusal to recognize Ornan as a citizen “by virtue of residency” – a member of a very large and important minority group of natives of the land who happen not to be Jewish – offers a solid confirmation that none of us in Israel posses the basic autonomy considered a fundamental human right: one’s right to determine one’s national identity.

How embarrassing, because the “right for self-determination” is a basic political right constantly flagged by the many advocates of Israel’s legitimacy, especially from the liberal-left wings of our political scene. Ignoring the fact that to be Jewish in Israel is not the privilege of the individual but of a very specific religious establishment; ignoring a list of legal and juristic precedents that cemented the inability of Israeli citizens to make personal decisions regarding their national identity, clearly puts the lid on the last excuse for the so-called legitimacy of the “Jewish and Democratic” state.

We are dealing here with a theological-clerical-based regime. It certainly shows – at least for the time being, at least as far as the citizens of the privileged group are concerned – many significant liberal characteristics, But this regime represents an anomaly in the norms of a world that is defined as democratic and “westernized”; the very world that the state of Israel, its elites and its leadership pretend to be a part of, nothing short of its flagship in the presumably wild Middle East.

It is worthwhile to quote Uzzi Ornan’s reaction upon the publication of the verdict by the three judges that rejected the Ani-Israeli appeal in October 2013:

“In its ruling, the court, in effect, agrees to totally ignore the obligations included in the Declaration of Independence, which promises full equality among all the state’s citizens, regardless of religion, race or gender. The government consensus that has developed ignores the existence of an Israeli people that was created with the Declaration of Independence. This consensus enables the Jewish majority to have full control over the country and to operate not for the benefit of Israeli citizens but for the benefit of the current political majority among the Jews.”

The Hebrew version of this article was published on “‘HaMishpat’ Online: Human Rights – Insight into Recent Judgments”; by the Emile Zola Chair for Human Rights, Haim Striks School of Law, COMAS, ISRAEL January2014 (PDF). Thanks to Liz Magnes for her assistance with the translation. The writer is one of 21 petitioners for the Ani-Israeli case and author of The Case for a Secular New Jerusalem, published May 2014 (English version of the Hebrew title “Eretz, Brith; Why Israelis do not have a Democratic, Secular State). 

Notes

1. File No. 8573/08Civil Appeal, Ornan et al. v .Ministry of Interior (Oct. 2,2013 amended on 6.10.2013), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.)(hereinafter: Israeli Nationality case);File No.8140/13 High Court of Justice, Ornan v. State of Israel (Dec. 9.2013), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (hereinafter: HCJ Ornan). 

2. Aeyal Gross, Analysis: Court rejection of Israeli nationality highlights flaws of Jewish democracy, Haaretz (Oct. 3, 2013); Jonathan Cook, Court nixes push for ‘Israeli nationality’, Aljazeera (Oct. 18, 2013); Ben Lynfield, Supreme Court rejects citizens’ bid to have nationality declared as Israeli rather than Jewish, The Independent (Oct. 3, 2010); Anshel Pfeffer, Israeli? There’s no such nationality, The Jewish Chronicle Online (Oct. 11, 2013); Ben White, Court denial of Israeli nationality reinforces discrimination, Memo (Oct. 7, 2013); Jonathan Cook, ‘I am Israeli’: Israel will not recognize an Israeli nationality while it seeks to maintain Jewishness at all costs, Uruknet (Oct. 15, 2013); Jonathan Cook, Lawsuit challenges Israel’s discriminatory citizenship definition, The Electronic Intifada (June 4, 2013); Omar Baraghouti, Israel refuses to recognize its own nationality: Israeli Supreme Court says ‘Israeli’ nationality could endanger idea of Jewish state, Mondoweiss, Oct. 8, 2013); Tia Goldenberg, Court rules no such thing as Israeli nationality, Jfjfp (Oct. 10, 2013); Tia Goldenberg, Israeli court rejects Israeli nationality status, The Times of Israel (Oct. 4, 2013); Alain Gresh, Juifs et pas Israeliens, Le Monde Diplomatique (Oct. 10, 2013); Florian Rötzer, Esgibtkeinisraelisches Volk, Telepolis (Oct. 10, 2013); Ulrike Putz, BewohnerIsraelsdurfensichnicht “Israelis” nennen, SpiegelOnline (Oct. 6, 2013); Batsheva Sobelman, No such thing as ‘Israel nationhood’, country’s Supreme Court says, L.A. Times (Oct. 3, 2013); Salman Masalha, Israeli Nationality – there’s no such animal, Haaretz (Oct. 27, 2013), (Isr.), For English version http://salmaghari-en.blogspot.co.il/2013/10/israeli-nationality-theres-no-such.html. 

3. HCJ Ornan, Supra note 1. 

4. idpar.a of Hon. Rubinstein opinion in HCJOrnan. 

5. Israel Nationality case, Supra note1, par. 18 of Hon. Fogelman opinion.

6. A line out of a popular Israeli verse; free translation from the Hebrew by this writer

7. HCJOrnan,Supra note 1,par. 11 of Hon. Meltzer opinion. 

8. CA 630/70 Tamarin v. State of Israel, 26(1) PD197[1972] (Isr.).

9. Israel Nationality case, Supra note 1.

10. Gross, Supra note2. Professor Gross also expressed this opinion at a panel discussion organized by the Israeli Liberal Forum in Tel Aviv, Dec. 11 2013 that was dedicated to the Ani Israeli verdict. 

11. See Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People, 5773–2013, P/19/1550. In practice this proposal will change the definition of Israel as a “Jewish and Democratic state”, prioritizing Jewish-ness over democracy; NGO Law Proposal (Repair – Exceptions of Registration and Activity of an Association), 5770–2010, P/18/2456. By this proposal, an NGO will not be permitted to register if “there is reason to assume that the NGO is supplying information to a foreign state or is involved in legal procedures abroad targeting senior government officials or IDF officers on suspicions of conducting war crimes”; Contributors to the State Bill, 2013 5773–2013, P/19/1596. The purpose of this bill is to deprive Arab-Israelis citizens who due to historical and political reasons do not serve in the Israeli army.

12. For the full list of Israeli Discriminatory Laws see Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel.

13. E.g. by Sikkuy the Association for the Advancement of Civic Society. 

14. Sadly the number now is down to 20, as ex-minister and Knesset member, long-time human rights activist ShulamitAloni passed away.


Tuesday, June 3, 2014

Latin America’s Rightwing Parties Are Falling Apart

Grace Livingstone
June 2, 2014
Le Monde Diplomatique

Rightwing parties in Latin America give themselves populist names, keep the manifesto rhetoric modest and talk of appealing to the street. But they aren’t winning many votes. Meanwhile business is learning to work with governments of the left.


“There are no conservative parties in Brazil,” claimed the magazine Veja in April. In a country where a centre-left Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores; PT) government has taken 40 million people out of poverty, none of Brazil’s 27 parties identify themselves as rightwing. Even the most reactionary have progressive-sounding names such as “the Democrats.” Brazil is not unique. Across Latin America, the rightwing parties that dominated in the 1990s are in disarray, struggling to develop a coherent electoral alternative to popular leftwing governments. A glance at the polls for this year’s elections suggests we should really be asking if the right has disappeared in Latin America.

A few bastions remain, such as Panama (where the centre-right Juan Carlos Varela was elected president on 5 May) and Colombia (where the right or centre-right candidates stand to win the 25 May election)— which, with Mexico, have most resisted the “pink tide.” But five of the seven presidential elections in Latin America this year are likely to go to the left or centre-left. In March the former guerrilla movement FMLN won in El Salvador, and in April the Citizens’ Action Party secured victory in Costa Rica. Bolivia, Uruguay and Brazil are expected to follow suit. Last year there were landslides for the left in Chile and Ecuador.

The neoliberal right is tainted by its record of economic crises, unemployment and hardship going back to the 1990s, and many conservatives are still associated with the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 80s. Reduced economic dependence on the United States, which has historically supported rightwing elites (from the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua to the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet), and the creation of new regional organisations that exclude the United States, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), have made it harder for rightwing parties to make headway.

A big problem for the right is how to create a successful alternative to the popular policies of the leftwing governments. Progressive governments have been using the proceeds of economic growth to fund generous social programmes that have cut poverty dramatically. This has forced rightwing parties to move to the centre, pledging to continue poverty alleviation programmes or, in the case of Brazil’s main opposition candidate Aécio Neves, extend them further. The leader of the “moderate” section of the Venezuelan opposition, Henrique Capriles, in a recent interview in Le Monde, tried to sound even more leftwing than the ruling Socialist Chavistas, accusing the government of “becoming bourgeois” and claiming that President Nicolás Maduro, unlike his predecessor Hugo Chávez, never leaves the presidential palace. He said: “It’s not enough to appeal to the middle class, we must also be able to articulate the aspirations of the poor. And to do that, we need to start from the shantytowns.” Tucked away in the manifestos of both Capriles and Neves are promises to make public services more “efficient” through privatisation, but their tone is moderate.

By adopting a conciliatory approach and focusing on basic issues such as economy and crime, the Capriles coalition, Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, hoped to defeat Chavismo. Though it did not succeed, it came within 1.5% of victory in the presidential election after Chávez’s death in March 2013. Since the opposition’s poor results in last December’s municipal elections, more radical leaders have arisen, who are trying to oust the elected president through street demonstrations and violent direct action, a strategy known as la salida (the exit).

Business elites have learned to work with leftwing governments, which has led to a separation of business and political opposition, and means that rightwing parties have lost their most important backers. Evo Morales, Bolivia’s indigenous activist president, faced in his early years a revolt by powerful landowners who control vast soya and sunflower plantations in the province of Santa Cruz. But opposition from agribusiness has recently subsided as landowners discovered that Morales, despite his radical rhetoric, has run a balanced budget, offered tax subsidies to agro-exporters and, crucially, has not carried out land reform in the rich eastern lowlands. (Instead, he has expropriated unproductive estates in northern areas). Bolivia’s rightwing parties are likely to get less than a third of the vote in this year’s presidential election.

In Peru, the powerful business elite, based on the mining of gold, copper, coal and iron ore, has been content with Ollanta Humala’s neoliberal fiscal policies and promotion of new mining projects, while Ecuador’s president, the leftwing economist Rafael Correa, elected in 2006, has astutely kept the middle class on board by providing political stability, economic growth, new road-building projects and fiscal conservatism.

The business elite in Brazil has also been satisfied with the PT’s policies, which have promoted economic growth, raised living standards, increased consumption and expanded the domestic market for Brazilian businesses (during the 2000s, 42 million people opened bank accounts, and 15 million flew for the first time), without fundamentally threatening the unequal social structure. Yet the PT has limited room for manoeuvre, because in Congress it is dependent on the right — its main coalition partner is the PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro; Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), which includes representatives of the agribusiness sector.

The PT’s success has left Neves struggling to define a clear alternative path. Neves belongs to the PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira; Brazilian Social Democracy Party), a middle-class group that grew out of opposition to the military dictatorship but adopted neoliberalism. The one big difference between the parties is on foreign policy: The PSDB has been critical of Brazil’s closeness to Venezuela and the decision to form an autonomous regional bloc, especially through UNASUR.

Although Dilma Rousseff’s PT is leading in the polls, sluggish economic growth and lower- and middle-class demands for improved public services and less spending on this summer’s World Cup or the 2016 Olympics, could provide opportunities for Neves. This reveals a weakness of the left’s model across Latin America: it relies on rapid economic growth through high prices for commodities (oil, soya, copper, gas) rather than economic diversification or structural reform, which could threaten powerful elites. This shows that, with political will, governments can improve the lives of their poorest citizens — an important lesson for austerity-stricken Europe. But it also shows the limits of a strategy that remains vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices.

In Chile, the model may be exhausted. The concept of neoliberal economics combined with social programmes was invented by the Concertación, Chile’s centre-left coalition, which governed for 20 years after the fall of Pinochet in 1990. The outgoing president, independent billionaire businessman Sebastián Piñera, whose economic policies were not notably different from those of the Concertación, faced demonstrations by students against private education and economic inequality. Yet his policies led Hernán Büchi (finance minister under Pinochet) to complain about tax rises and obstacles to investment “to protect the environment,” and the continuation of “welfare measures aimed at workers that impinge on personal liberties,” adding, “We do not need to behave like a shamefaced right.”

Socialist Michelle Bachelet pledged free university education funded by corporate taxation and a reform of Pinochet’s constitution on her election in December 2013, and her second term promises to be more to the left than her first (2006-10). After a disastrous election showing, the two main rightwing parties suffered defections, and there is talk of a new centre-right party being formed around Piñera. But Bachelet’s radical agenda could unite the right by provoking hardline Pinochetistas and neoliberals.

Chile and Brazil are often seen as the moderate end of the “pink tide.” Brazil has played a crucial role geopolitically, strengthening new regional organisations and pushing continental politics to the left. But this has also helped homogenise some policies by encouraging members of regional organisations to find common ground. Olivier Dabène, a professor at Sciences Po in Paris, pointed out in 2012 that CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) is led by a troika — the country that holds the presidency, its predecessor and its successor elect (Venezuela, Chile and Cuba at the time): “This strange trio do not seem to be experiencing any particular difficulties in working together. ... This illustrates the (relatively new) ability of Latin American countries to set aside political differences in the interests of pursuing the common good. The fashion is for pragmatism and flexibility, which constitutes progress on regionalism in the Latin American and Caribbean region.”

As Colombia’s president Juan Manuel Santos — from one of the most influential families of the Bogotá elite — understands, ideological rigidity can be an obstacle to trade. His efforts to renew ties with Venezuela have boosted bilateral trade, which had plummeted because of Álvaro Uribe’s aggressive stance against Venezuela, from $2.6bn in 2008 to less than $800m in 2010, with a major loss of income for the Colombian bourgeoisie.

Unlike Uribe, an outspoken hardliner who led a US-funded military offensive against the FARC guerrillas, Santos is a sophisticated operator who has charmed European liberals by calling for the legalisation of marijuana. He understands that social reform is needed to undercut support for the guerrillas. In 2011 he pushed through a law to give land back to displaced peasants and launched peace talks with the FARC. His difficulty is that many local landowners, and their paramilitary allies, are opposed to any redistribution of land.

Santos also recognises that Uribe’s pro-US stance left Colombia isolated in Latin America, and has tried to build bridges with Asia and with his Latin American neighbours. In 2012 Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Chile formed the Pacific Alliance, a trade bloc that aims to take advantage of their coastline to increase trade with Asia, and that promotes itself as a “free-market” alternative to the trade bloc Mercosur, which it sees as too protectionist.

The picture on socio-cultural issues is more mixed, and the difference between left and right is blurred. Governments of both the left (Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil) and the right (Mexico, Colombia) have approved gay civil partnerships, despite criticism from the Church and conservative sectors of society. In Chile, Bachelet backed Sebastián Piñera’s civil partnership bill against opposition from the allies of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI; formerly close to Pinochet).

On women’s reproductive rights, many on both the left and right take a very hard line. President Correa of Ecuador recently threatened to resign if the national assembly decriminalises abortion, which is allowed only when the mother’s life is in danger, or when a mentally handicapped woman has been raped. In Nicaragua, Sandinista Daniel Ortega has backed an all-out ban on abortion. Except in Cuba, Uruguay and Mexico, abortion is severely restricted in Latin America, and the progressives are making little headway. In Brazil’s 2010 presidential election the main candidates, Dilma Rousseff and José Serra, who had both previously supported abortion, came out against it to court the Catholic vote.

This does not mean that left and right are now indistinguishable. The relative dominance of social issues, which the left is working to establish, has forced experimentation on the elements of the right that want to turn over a new leaf. But there is nothing to suggest that the experiments constitute an ideological revolution or are anything more than strategic manoeuvres. As evidenced by many coup attempts, successful (Honduras in 2009, Paraguay in 2012) and unsuccessful (Venezuela in 2002, Bolivia in 2008, Ecuador in 2010), it would be a mistake to think the authoritarian old right has given up.

Grace Livingstone is the author of America’s Backyard: The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror, Zed Books, London, 2009.


Hamas and Abbas driven together by desperation

OPINION/EDITORIAL

Abdel Bari Atwan The Electronic Intifada 2 June 2014


The government of national consensus that took the oath of office before Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas today may save Hamas from its suffocating financial crisis and the heavy burden of administering Gaza, but at the same time will weaken the movement and lead to internal crises in the foreseeable future.

There is no question that the siege the movement has experienced over the past year, since a military coup removed elected Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi, had put Hamas in a deep hole due to the near permanent closure of the Rafah crossing, the destruction of more than one thousand tunnels that were a lifeline for Gaza’s economy, and due to the vicious Egyptian media campaign against it.

Hamas has put all its eggs in the basket of Abbas, giving him all the concessions he wanted. But Abbas’ basket is full of holes and he too is facing severe crises of his own after the failure of his negotiating strategy with Israel. Like Hamas, he is merely jumping from the frying pan into the fire.

When I say that Hamas waved the white flag and gave in to all of Abbas’ conditions and demands, I am referring to its relinquishing of three major ministerial portfolios: first, the foreign ministry — Hamas had rejected Riyad al-Maliki remaining in that role but agreed after Abbas insisted. Second, there was the ministry of religious affairs — Hamas tried to put forward a different candidate than the one selected, and finally the ministry of prisoner affairs, which Abbas abolished under Israeli and American pressure.

One cannot therefore describe this as a “government of national consensus” by any stretch of the imagination — despite Hamas welcoming its installation at the last minute. Rather it is the government of Abbas and his authority. The four Gaza ministers, all of them independents, were not permitted to travel to Ramallah for the swearing-in ceremony, except for Ziad Abu Amra, the minister of culture who was already in Ramallah.

It is difficult to be optimistic about the ability of this government to achieve its greatest responsibility which is organizing presidential and legislative elections at the end of the six-month period that is envisaged for them to take place. The biggest reason is Israel’s threats not to recognize or deal with the government, except perhaps in exchange for an enormous price: Abbas dropping his conditions for returning to the negotiating table, including the release of a fourth batch of prisoners and the freezing of settlements.

The contradictory statements from Hamas leaders and spokespersons in the final hours before the government was sworn in reveal the confusion within the movement’s ranks. They also reveal the clear divisions between two factions — one that from the beginning of the “reconciliation” process opposed giving the keys of government back to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and creating a consensus government according to Abbas’ conditions, and another faction that saw that given the severe financial crisis and siege, Hamas would have to leave office and return to the situation that existed before 2007 when it took power in the Gaza Strip.

Perhaps it is too early to render judgment about Hamas’ choice, but there is no doubt that Abbas dictated all the conditions and put a gun to Hamas’ head. He told them either you accept or I will put a bullet into the “reconciliation” agreement. Hamas, or at least the prevailing faction within it, preferred to accept Abbas’ terms, dropping all the movement’s objections.

The government was announced at 1pm, just before Abbas headed off to Jordan.

Writer and broadcaster Abdel Bari Atwan is the founder of Rai al-Youm, where this op-ed was first published in Arabic. He is the former editor of the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi and is the author of numerous books.

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Sunday, June 1, 2014

US Water Wars in the Middle East

MAY 27, 2014

A New Age of Hydro-Imperialism

by GARIKAI CHENGU
Water is to the twenty-first century what oil was to the twentieth century: the commodity that determines the wealth and stability of nations.

People who think that the West’s interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria are only about oil are mistaken. Broadly speaking, Western interest in the Middle East is becoming increasingly about a commodity more precious than oil, namely water.

According to the U.S.-based Center for Public Integrity, Western nations stand to make up to a US$1 trillion from privatizing, purifying and distributing water in a region where water often sells for far more than oil.

Although over two thirds of our planet is water, we face an acute shortage. This scarcity flies in the face of our natural assumptions. The problem is that 97 percent is salt water. Great for fish, not so good for humans. Of the world’s fresh water, only one percent is available for drinking, with the remaining two percent trapped in glaciers and ice.

Put differently: if all the water on earth was represented by an 11-litre jug, the freshwater would fill a single cup, and we can only access the last drop.

Nature has decreed that the supply of water is fixed; all the while, demand is rising as the world’s population increases and enriches itself. By 2030, climate change, population growth, pollution and urbanization will compound, such that the demand for water globally is estimated to outstrip supply by forty percent.

Increasingly, for water to be useful, it needs to be mined, processed, packaged, and transported, just like gold, coal, gas or oil. Unlike oil, there are no substitutes, alternatives or stopgaps for water.

There have been three waves of resource-driven imperialism in the modern era.

A quest for gold fueled the first wave. Old-fashioned colonialists, regal and unembarrassed, rode in on horseback, brutally took control of American territories, sent in ostrich-plumed governors, minted coins with the Queen’s head on them, and gazed proudly over natives toiling away in perilous mine-shafts. An unprecedented kidnapping of millions of Africans ensued, so as to replace the indigenous Americans that had initially been exterminated by their European conquerors. This coincided with white pioneers brutally conquering Southern Africa, also in search of gold.

The second wave of imperialism has been driven by an unquenchable, post-industrial thirst for oil.

Modern petro-imperialism, the key aspect of which is the U.S. military’s transformation into a global oil-protection armed force, puts up a democratic facade, emphasizes freedom of the seas (or pipeline routes), and seeks to secure, protect, drill, and ship oil, not to administer everyday affairs. Nevertheless, the means by which the U.S. is centering its foreign policy around oil is hardly new in spirit, albeit unprecedented in scope.

The third wave of imperialist wars is currently being fought over nature’s most valuable commodity: water. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, CIA analysts reported on a prediction of a new theater of war: hydrological warfare, “in which rivers, lakes and aquifers become national security assets to be fought over, or controlled”. These predictions became realized in quick succession, beginning with the recent wars in Iraq, Libya and Syria. It is now clear that the age of hydro-imperialism is upon us.

On April 17, 2003, in Iraq, the American company Bechtel received a no-bid reconstruction contract from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for US$100 billion; thus, making it the largest Iraq reconstruction contract. Therefore, the most lucrative Iraq reconstruction contract was not used to repair oil facilities, build schools and hospitals, or to repair bombarded infrastructure: it was used to source, process, and distribute water.

The secretive, opaque and no-bid nature of the water contract award process is made even worse by one incredible fact. Bechtel has botched many of its previous projects.

In California, Bechtel installed one of the nuclear power plant reactors backwards. In Boston, what promised to be a US$2.5 billion job for an infamous “Big Dig” project became the most expensive in U.S. history costing US$14.6 billion. The tunnel project was plagued by charges of poor execution, corruption, criminal arrests, and even four deaths.

In Bolivia, Bechtel’s record is one of privatizing water by inflating prices by 35 percent. The inflation caused public riots, in which several people died. Bechtel was ousted from the country and tried to sue the Bolivian government for canceling their contract.

Since the turn of the century, Iraq was the first casualty of hydro-imperialism, and Colonel Gaddafi’s assassination marked the second. Libya sits atop a natural resource more valuable than oil: the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer, which is a vast underground reserve of fresh water, estimated to be the largest in the world. Mr. Gaddafi had invested $25 billion into the aquifer, which had the potential to turn a country that is 95 percent desert into an arable oasis. As it now stands, France’s global mega-water companies: Suez, Ondeo, and Saur, control almost half of the world’s $400 billion water market. They are poised to rake in billions of dollars from Libya’s eighth wonder of the world.

Mr. Gaddafi had intended the scheme to be designed by Libyans, constructed by Libyans, for the benefit of the Libyan population. Now it is being redesigned by Frenchmen and women at inflated costs, constructed by French contractors, largely for the benefit of French shareholders. Libyan taxpayers will undoubtably be stuck with the bill and higher water bills.

The most recent case of hydro-imperialism is the war in Syria. Israel has been leading a Western campaign to support Syrian rebels; in part, because its leaders assert that the Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad, poses an existential threat to Israel on the issue of water. Mr. Assad has vowed to reclaim the Golan Heights – a strip of land that Israel captured from Syria in the Six Day War of 1967. The Golan Heights provides a staggering 40 percent of Israel’s fresh water.

“Syrian control of half of our water poses more of a threat than Iran with one bomb”, once remarked ex-Israeli intelligence head, Meir Dagan.

Mr. Assad has also been reticent to privatize the water industry and expose the population to predatory pricing, thereby preventing the West from tapping into a multi-billion dollar revenue stream.

Mr. Assad`s refusal to play ball on water privatization and his choice to play hardball over the Golan Heights meant that the Syrian President, like Mr. Hussein and Colonel Gaddafi before him, is an obstacle to the West`s hydro-imperialist agenda.

Control of nature`s most precious and increasingly valuable commodity will, for any nation, spell the difference between greatness and decline. Mr. Hussein, Colonel Gaddafi and a defiant Mr. Assad know that all too well.

Garikai Chengu is a scholar at Harvard University.